VAR Errors and the potential Distortion of Competition in the UEFA Champions League: A Competition Law Perspective

Since UEFA announced the introduction of the Video Assistant Referee (VAR) in the 2019/2020 football season, it has fundamentally transformed elite European football. Upon its introduction the objective was clear: enhance fairness, reduce clear refereeing mistakes and strengthen sporting integrity. Then why does this tool, which is supposed to provide "fairness" in football, cause so many controversies?

Several years into its application, VAR is increasingly contested in both national leagues as well as in the UEFA Champions League. A recent example in national context is the controversial disallowed goal of FC Barcelona’s Pau Cubarsí against Girona FC, which reignited public debate about consistency, transparency and the limits of technological intervention. Similar incidents have occurred in the Champions League, where decisions are scrutinised globally in real time, debated across media platforms and, more importantly, openly challenged by clubs, coaches and supporters. That said, reversing or formally challenging VAR decisions remains very difficult, as there is little room for appealing them. Such rulings however are often decisive in a club’s progression in the Champions League. Nowadays, a club’s advancement in the competition is of ever-growing importance, given the significant economic consequences tied to it. This raises the question, in case such incidents are no longer isolated controversies but part of a broader structural discussion, whether VAR in its governance framework genuinely enhances fairness or risks distorting competition under European competition law.

This article analyses the use of VAR in elite European football within the legal framework of European competition law, and it examines whether its current application could pose a risk of distorting competition. Furthermore, it considers how potential risks could be addressed and/or mitigated in order to promote fairness of the game with consideration for the need for effective and ad hoc decision-making.

The Europeanisation of sport and the ‘reach’ of EU Law

Before assessing VAR and its potential competition-distorting effects, it is essential to understand the broader legal framework that governs European football. Football, like other sports, has traditionally enjoyed a degree of autonomy, allowing governing bodies to regulate competitions, transfers, and eligibility rules largely independently. This autonomy was rooted in the belief that sporting rules serve purely athletic or ethical objectives, rather than economic ones. Early case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) reflected this in a “sporting exception,” holding that purely sporting regulations could fall outside the scope of EU law when they lacked cross-border economic relevance.

However, as professional football became highly commercialised and the economic impact of its regulations became increasingly evident, EU law was presented an opportunity to broaden its influence. International competitions, player transfers, broadcasting rights, and sponsorship deals often started to entail economic cross-border activities influencing the EU’s internal market and thus triggering the EU treaties’ material scope.

A turning-point was the ground-breaking Bosman case i in which the CJEU ruled that football transfer rules restricting player mobility violated EU free movement law. The case decisively demonstrated that sporting autonomy is not absolute and that sporting regulations affecting the EU’s internal market are subject to EU law. The CJEU clarified furthermore that this goes as well for sports governing bodies (like UEFA and FIFA) that are seated outside the EU (e.g. in Switzerland), in case the majority of their activities are carried out within the EU and they engage in practices that affect competition or freedom of movement within ‘the Community’. Regarding competition law, this principle was refined in subsequent rulings such as Meca-Medina ii. Therein the CJEU established that sports rules are subject to EU competition law whenever they produce economic effects, unless the restrictions are inherent to and proportionate for achieving legitimate sporting objectives.

Most recently, the CJEU’s 2023 “December rulings” about the European Superleague iii, International Skating Union iv and Royal Antwerp FC v, have reinforced this scrutiny. In European Super League, the CJEU held that FIFA and UEFA’s prior authorisation and sanctioning regime for competing competitions infringed Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU) due to the lack of transparent, objective, and proportionate criteria. These judgments highlighted once more that sports governing bodies exercising both regulatory and economic power are not exempt from competition law obligations and must demonstrate procedural fairness, transparency, and proportionality in their rules.

UEFA as an undertaking and market regulator

Since EU case law has established that sporting activity can be (fully) subject to EU law, this means sports governing bodies may fall within the scope of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU on competition law when their regulatory decisions affect market access, competitive balance or commercial revenues. Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements between undertakings and decisions by associations of undertakings that restrict competition, while Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abuse of a dominant position within the internal market.

Central to both provisions is the concept of an “undertaking,” which the CJEU has defined broadly as any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status or method of financing. vi This raises the question of whether UEFA and its activities fall within that scope. Applying the definition of “undertaking(s)” to UEFA, it clearly qualifies: the organisation runs competitions, markets broadcasting rights, distributes prize money, and controls access to the most lucrative club tournament in Europe, all unmistakably economic activities.

EU law recognises that an entity may simultaneously exercise both economic and regulatory roles. While certain purely regulatory or public authority functions may fall outside the scope of competition law, sporting bodies like UEFA, engaging in market-related activities cannot in principle escape scrutiny under EU competition rules. vii In this context, UEFA occupies a dominant position in the market for pan-European club football competitions. It operates simultaneously as a rule-maker, competition organiser, commercial rights holder, and disciplinary authority. This concentration of powers is central to the competition law assessment.

VAR within UEFA’s regulatory framework and the economic consequences of progression in the Champions League

In the 2019/2020 season, VAR was introduced to correct “clear and obvious errors” in four match-defining situations: goals, penalties, (direct) red cards and mistaken identity. While it is formally up to the on-field referee to make the final decision, in practice VAR’s influence is often decisive. It can be said in particular with regard to decisions on whether to award a penalty after a foul, that VAR often has a decisive influence on the course of a match or even (directly) on its outcome.

The principal concern with VAR lies less in the technology itself than in its governance structure. VAR decisions are final and binding, there is (practically) no possibility to challenge decisions or an independent external review mechanism during the competition. Sporting results remain unchanged even where UEFA subsequently acknowledges errors, and transparency remains limited due to the incomplete publication of audio recordings or detailed reasoning.

One could argue that, prior to the introduction of VAR, decisions taken by the on-field referee were equally final and, in practice, also not subject to review. However, at that time there was no meaningful technological possibility for review; referees were required to make split-second judgements based solely on what they could observe in real time. Today, by contrast, advanced video technology enables multiple camera angles, slow-motion replays, and frame-by-frame analysis, often allowing clubs, professionals and the general public to see with considerable clarity whether an incident involves a goal, a penalty, a direct red card, or mistaken identity. In that context, VAR decisions that are widely regarded as incorrect are deemed less excusable, precisely because the technological means to make an accurate decision are available and it is precisely VAR’s task to prevent errors being made.

Although the principles of legal certainty and competition continuity justify a degree of finality, the structural absence of robust accountability mechanisms may give rise to systemic risks. This is all the more problematic since the UEFA Champions League, and professional international football in a general sense, is no longer merely a sporting contest. Major economic consequences are nowadays tied to sporting success. Advancing even a single round may represent millions of euros in revenue, which can be deduced by the following information published by UEFA:

“Clubs that qualify for the knockout stage can expect to receive the following amounts:

− qualification for the knockout round play-offs: €1m per club

− qualification for the round of 16: €11m per club

− qualification for the quarter-finals: €12.5m per club

− qualification for the semi-finals: €15m per club

− qualification for the final: €18.5m per club” viii

Consequently, a single decisive VAR intervention can have significant financial implications. If errors are random and evenly distributed, competition law concerns remain limited. However, if systemic patterns, opacity, or structural bias exist, particularly in light of UEFA’s dual regulatory and commercial role, the issue becomes considerably more complex.

Potential competition-distorting effects under article 102 TFEU

Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abuse of a dominant position within the internal market. In simple terms, this means that an organisation like UEFA, holding substantial market power, may not use its power in a way that unfairly distorts competition. In the context of European football, the relevant question is whether structurally unaccountable VAR governance could amount to such an abuse given the large economic consequences tied to progression in the Champions League.

To establish an infringement of article 102 TFEU, three elements must generally be demonstrated:

1. Dominant position;

An entity must possess sufficient economic power to act, to a significant degree, independently of competitive pressures and without being effectively constrained by competitors, customers, or consumers. In the organisation of elite European club competitions, UEFA is very likely to qualify as dominant, given its exclusive regulatory and commercial control over competitions such as the UEFA Champions League. This includes the functioning of VAR.

2. ⁠Conduct capable of distorting competition; and

The dominant entity must engage in behaviour that has the potential to restrict or distort competition. In sport, “competition” does not only refer to economic rivalry between undertakings, but also to the competitive structure of the sporting contest itself, which has economic consequences (e.g. prize money, sponsorship, and market value). By introducing a mechanism like VAR that could alter the outcome of matches, based on intervening regarding the on-field referee’s decision, systemic deficiencies could amount to conduct capable of distorting competition.

3. ⁠Lack of objective justification or proportionality.

Even where conduct has restrictive effects, it may be lawful if it pursues a legitimate objective and is necessary and proportionate to achieving that aim.

VAR errors per se do not constitute abuse, as football inevitably involves human interpretation and isolated refereeing mistakes are unlikely to meet the high threshold required under Article 102 TFEU. Only persistent, structural deficiencies capable of producing measurable distortions of competition could give rise to serious concerns. In that respect, systemic governance shortcomings may be more legally relevant than individual errors, particularly in light of recent CJEU case law emphasising transparency, objective criteria, and effective procedural safeguards in sports governance. If UEFA’s VAR framework were found to lack sufficient procedural guarantees, scrutiny under article 102 would become conceivable. However, even if that threshold is ultimately not met, it remains advisable to further strengthen VAR’s governance design in order to address ongoing concerns and criticism within professional football.

Reform options: Strengthening accountability without undermining finality

Arguably the most self-evident reform option would be to increase transparency by establishing an independent oversight body to review VAR performance throughout the competition. This could reduce the concentration of regulatory and evaluative authority within UEFA. Such a body, composed for example of former referees, legal experts, and independent stakeholders, could assess consistency, procedural compliance, and patterns of decision-making across matches. Thereby, an additional layer of accountability would be introduced without interfering with the finality of sporting results. This way VAR would be improved ‘behind the scenes’ in order to enhance the correctness of VAR decisions.

In addition, greater transparency would likely enhance procedural fairness and strengthen public trust. The systematic publication of full VAR audio recordings, together with detailed written reasoning explaining why the “clear and obvious error” threshold was or was not met, would make the decision-making process more understandable and reviewable. Transparency not only improves legitimacy in the eyes of clubs and supporters, but also aligns with broader EU law principles requiring objective and verifiable criteria in regulatory frameworks.

Finally, the strengthening of standardised training programmes, harmonised interpretative guidelines, and uniform performance metrics for referees and VAR officials across competitions would contribute to greater consistency and reduce divergence in the application of key concepts such as “clear and obvious error”. While match results cannot realistically be overturned without undermining legal certainty and the integrity of the competition, a structured post-match review mechanism could also serve an important corrective function. Such a mechanism could identify systemic inconsistencies, issue interpretative guidance, and feed lessons learned back into referee training and protocol development.

Conclusion

In conclusion, while VAR aims to improve fairness and reduce refereeing errors, its current governance raises potential competition law concerns under Article 102 TFEU. Isolated mistakes alone are unlikely to constitute abuse, but systemic deficiencies -such as limited transparency, lack of independent oversight, and structural asymmetry - could, in theory, distort competition by affecting match outcomes with significant economic consequences. UEFA’s dual role as both regulator and commercial rights holder amplifies the legal scrutiny, as structural governance flaws may fall within the ambit of EU competition law. Strengthening independent oversight, transparency, and standardised procedures would mitigate these risks while preserving the integrity and finality of matches. Ultimately, VAR’s legitimacy in the Champions League depends on ensuring that technological interventions reinforce, rather than inadvertently undermine, both sporting fairness and competition law compliance.

References:

i. Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and Others, and Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman, C-415/93, EU:C:1995/463

ii. David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities, C-519/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2006:492.

iii. European Superleague Company, SL v Fédération internationale de football association (FIFA) and Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), C-333/21, ECLI:EU:2023:1011.

iv. International Skating Union v EU Commission and Others, C-124/21 P, ECLI: EU:C:2023:1012.

v. UL, SA Royal Antwerp Football Club v Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL (URBSFA), C-680/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:1010.

vi. Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH, C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161.

vii. Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, C-309/99, ECLI:EU:C:2002:98.

viii. UEFA, Distribution to clubs from the UEFA Champions League, UEFA Europa League, UEFA Conference League and the UEFA Super Cup for the 2024–27 cycle (2025/26 season) Payments for the qualifying phases Solidarity payments for non-participating clubs, available at: https://editorial.uefa.com/resources/029a-1e0b5460b86d-31e6cad26358-1000/20250616_circular_2025_32_en.pdf